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INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF HOUSING SECURITY AND 
COMMUNITY STABILITY 
For many decades, economists and planners have debated the 
value of rent control, staking out opposing sides of the debate with 
results that are  mixed.1  For the most part, the literature adopts a 
conventional approach to assessing the effectiveness of rent 
stabilization ordinances, asking, for a particular city with rent control, 
how many renters are protected and affordable units preserved, and 
 
 1. See, e.g., W. Dennis Keating et al., Conclusion, in 204 RENT CONTROL: 
REGULATION AND THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET 205–06 (W. Dennis Keating et al. 
eds., 1998); MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., USC DORNSIFE PROGRAM FOR ENVTL. & REG’L 
EQUITY, RENT MATTERS: WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF RENT STABILIZATION 
MEASURES? 1, 4 (2018), 
https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/docs/Rent_Matters_PERE_Report_Final_02.
pdf [https://perma.cc/PB94-67PK]. 
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whether the ordinance dampened housing production.2  The 
conclusion is usually that there are some winners (typically long-term 
residents) and some losers (particularly low-income newcomers).3 
Yet, it is entirely possible that impacts of rent stabilization vary by 
neighborhood.  Neighborhoods differ in terms of their mix of housing 
and their trajectories of change.  Some are homogeneous 
communities of single-family homeowners, untouched by rent 
stabilization.  Others have a mix of building and tenure types — for 
example, apartment buildings with renter occupants may act as a 
more flexible housing supply.  Some are high-income and exclusive, 
gradually losing their low-income residents without replacement.  
Others are low-income and gentrifying with new affluent residents.  
Still other low-income areas are simply churning low-income 
residents.  These differing contexts offer varying degrees of stability 
and security for their residents. 
In a diverse, rapidly changing low-income neighborhood, rent 
stabilization may cause fewer residents to move out, intensifying 
competition and increasing rents for the few housing units available.4  
In an exclusive neighborhood populated primarily by affluent 
residents, rent-stabilized units play a similar role in terms of slowing 
exit rates, but without creating the same kind of pressure on the other 
units.  Given high land costs in these areas, these units also may 
become the only feasible way of preserving affordability.  At the same 
time, there may be pressure to convert housing units, whether in 
single-family homes or apartment buildings, from rental to 
homeowner tenures. 
Neighborhood dynamics also vary depending on regional context.  
Rent stabilization ordinances are enacted city by city, likely resulting 
in spillover effects in neighboring municipalities.  For instance, to the 
extent that stabilization reduces churn, and thus housing supply, 
adjacent communities may experience a surge in demand — and 
prices.5  This may then result in conversion from homeowner to rental 
 
 2. See Andrejs Skaburskis & Michael B. Teitz, The Economics of Rent 
Regulation, in RENT CONTROL: REGULATION AND THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET 
41, 42–43 (W. Dennis Keating et al. eds., 1998). 
 3. See generally W. Dennis Keating, Rent Control: Its Origins, History, and 
Controversies, in RENT CONTROL: REGULATION AND THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET 
1, 12 (W. Dennis Keating et al. eds., 1998). 
 4. Rebecca Diamond et al., The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, 
Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 24181, 2019). 
 5. While to our knowledge, no study to date has examined spillover effects 
between municipalities, a study of Cambridge, Massachusetts did find spillover 
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units, or simply an increase in exclusion as low-income in-movers are 
priced out. 
This Article shifts the analytic lens from examining the 
effectiveness of rent stabilization ordinances at preserving 
affordability and supply to surveying how they work in different 
neighborhood contexts throughout a diverse region — the 31-county 
New York metropolitan region and its 20 million residents.  The 
analysis provided in this Article develops a typology of neighborhood 
change, using United States Census data, that demonstrates the 
extent to which low-income households are being displaced from both 
low-income and moderate-to-high income neighborhoods.  It then 
couples this typology with estimations of the potential number of 
rental units that would be affected by rent regulation.  This Article 
finds that over 1.2 million units could potentially be protected; about 
three-quarters of these are currently affordable at the regional 
median household income.6  The majority of the neighborhoods 
potentially most affected by rent regulation are low-income (i.e. those 
with a median household income of less than 80% of the regional 
median).7  Most of these neighborhoods are either currently 
undergoing processes of gentrification, displacement, or both; or have 
vulnerabilities that place them at risk of such change.8 
By analyzing how rent control works across a variety of 
neighborhood types, from gentrifying to exclusionary and from 
majority renter to homeowner, this Article provides a new 
perspective on how renter protections maintain stable and secure 
communities.  Whether or not rent stabilization ordinances work to 
preserve affordability, they may play an important role in helping 
low-income residents achieve other goals, such as upward mobility or 
a sense of community, while also supporting cities in their goals for 
local diversity, inclusion, and fair housing. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the literature on 
neighborhood change, with a focus on the various forms of 
neighborhood ascent, from gentrification to exclusion.9  Part II 
 
effects within the city. Property values increased in previously unstabilized buildings 
upon the repeal of rent regulation. David H. Autor et al., Housing Market Spillovers: 
Evidence from the End of Rent Control in Cambridge, Massachusetts 661, 710 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18125, 2014). 
 6. See infra Table 3. 
 7. See infra Table 3. 
 8. See infra Figure 1. 
 9. See Ann Owens, Neighborhoods on the Rise: A Typology of Neighborhoods 
Experiencing Socioeconomic Ascent, 11 CITY & COMMUNITY 345, 346 (2012). 
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examines the variation in types of tenure across neighborhoods.  
After a brief discussion of the methodological approach to analyzing 
census data, Part III constructs typologies of neighborhood change 
across the 31-county New York metropolitan region10 and examines 
how they relate to the location of renter households.  Part IV 
examines how rent stabilization preserves affordability across 
different neighborhood types.  Finally, the conclusion offers thoughts 
for further research and implications for policy. 
I. UNDERSTANDING NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE 
Part I.A begins with an overview of theories and evidence about 
neighborhood change across a variety of communities: from cities to 
suburbs, and from low-income to high-income to mixed-income 
communities.  Part I.B then discusses different policies that have been 
implemented to stabilize neighborhoods, such as fair share housing, 
inclusionary zoning, and rent stabilization.  It concludes with an 
examination of existing literature on how these policies, including 
rent regulations, perform in different neighborhood types. 
A. Theories and Evidence on Neighborhood Change 
Understandings of neighborhood change have developed over 
time.  The invasion-succession model of the Chicago school has long 
dominated scholarship about neighborhood change — it describes a 
process by which lower-income residents residing in the inner core of 
the city invade the outer rings and gradually succeed the higher-
income residents.11  Theorized during a period of rapid growth in the 
city of Chicago, this model describes an influx of immigrants or 
increase in incomes that will spur the succession process.12  New 
competition for land causes shifts in concentric rings or zones, with 
residents sorting themselves by socioeconomic status into 
neighborhoods.13  With the Chicago core increasingly occupied by 
 
 10. The 31-county region includes the five boroughs of New York City (Bronx, 
Kings, Manhattan, Queens, and Richmond), counties in Connecticut (Fairfield, 
Litchfield, and New Haven), New Jersey (Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Hunterdon, 
Mercer, Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris, Ocean, Passaic, Somerset, Sussex, and 
Union), and New York (Dutchess, Nassau, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Suffolk, 
Sullivan, Ulster, Warren, and Westchester). 
 11. See Ernest W. Burgess, The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a 
Research Project, in THE CITY 47, 50–51 (Ellsworth Faris et al. eds., 1925). 
 12. See Ernest W. Burgess, The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a 
Research Project, in THE CITY 47, 54–56 (Morris Janowitz ed., 1967). 
 13. Id. at 56–57. 
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high-end commercial uses, developers constructed new 
neighborhoods on the periphery, attracting higher-income residents 
ready to leave their aging properties in the urban core.14  Just as they 
began to provide a lower quality of shelter, these housing units 
filtered down to lower-income groups, who often overcrowded into 
the units and hastened their decline.15 
Whether or not through invasion-succession, the majority of 
metropolises end up in a pattern of concentric rings or zones: the 
innermost ring occupied by the commercial and residential renters 
able to pay the most, subsequent rings occupied by households of a 
mix of incomes, and the most affluent households occupying the 
outermost ring.16  Pockets of concentrated poverty remain and, in 
some regions, have increased.17  However, the diversity of many 
neighborhoods in the urban core is increasing, perhaps due to 
neighborhood ascent.18  Somewhere between 14% and 20% of 
neighborhoods actually ascend in socioeconomic status each decade, 
and though the majority of these are white suburbs, diverse minority 
and immigrant core neighborhoods are increasingly likely to see 
higher incomes as well.19  Some of this change is due to upgrading by 
incumbent residents.20  Another reason for this change is best 
characterized as gentrification, a form of revitalization that is 
depicted by both an influx of new investment and an inflow of new 
 
 14. See HOMER HOYT, U.S. FED. HOUS. ADMIN., THE STRUCTURE AND GROWTH 
OF RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS IN AMERICAN CITIES 82 (1939), 
http://archive.org/details/structuregrowtho00unitrich [https://perma.cc/TJK6-
KWGX]. 
 15. See id. at 122. 
 16. See Rachel E. Dwyer, Poverty, Prosperity, and Place: The Shape of Class 
Segregation in the Age of Extremes, 57 SOC. PROBS. 114, 125 (2010). 
 17. PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, THE CENTURY FOUND. & RUTGERS CTR. FOR URBAN 
RESEARCH & EDUC., CONCENTRATION OF POVERTY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: 
CHANGES IN PREVALENCE, COMPOSITION, AND LOCATION OF HIGH POVERTY 
NEIGHBORHOODS 2 (2013), https://production-
tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2013/12/18013623/Concentration_of_Poverty_in_the_New_
Millennium-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/LVT2-7TWV]. 
 18. Owens, supra note 9, at 357. Owens defines ascent as “neighborhoods that 
experience improving socioeconomic status (SES) regardless of socioeconomic 
origin, outcome, or process, with gentrification only one type of change falling under 
this umbrella.” Id. at 346. 
 19. Id. at 363. 
 20. See PHILLIP L. CLAY, NEIGHBORHOOD RENEWAL: MIDDLE-CLASS 
RESETTLEMENT AND INCUMBENT UPGRADING IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 7 
(1979) (defining incumbent upgrading as a process in which existing residents 
improve the conditions of their housing unit, resulting in physical impacts without 
socioeconomic changes). 
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people, typically of higher educational and income levels than the 
original residents, into low-income neighborhoods.21 
Neighborhood change in the suburbs has garnered relatively less 
attention from scholars.  Some have noted the rise of the polycentric 
region, where cities on the edge of the traditional urban core contain 
new concentrations of jobs surrounded by housing.22  This new 
centering attracts new upper-income residents, resulting in suburban 
neighborhood ascent or gentrification.23  Recent observers are likely 
to note the decline of the inner-ring suburbs.24  However, instead of 
zones of homogeneity, today’s inner-ring suburbs appear increasingly 
diverse.25 
Neighborhood change also occurs in affluent areas, which may 
increasingly exclude low-income households as housing becomes 
more expensive.  Despite pockets of diversity, economic segregation 
has generally increased since the 1970s, and is associated with 
increased racial segregation.26  Increases are particularly pronounced 
in more affluent neighborhoods.  Between 1980 and 2010, the share of 
 
 21. KAREN CHAPPLE, PLANNING SUSTAINABLE CITIES AND REGIONS: TOWARDS 
MORE EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT 141 (2015). 
 22. See JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 6–7 (1991); 
Alex Anas et al., Urban Spatial Structure, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1426, 1427 
(1998); E. Heikkila et al., What Happened to the CBD-Distance Gradient?: Land 
Values in a Polycentric City, 21 ENV’T & PLAN. A 221, 221 (1989); Robert Lang & 
Paul K. Knox, The New Metropolis: Rethinking Megalopolis, 43 REGIONAL STUD. 
789, 792 (2009); Robert Lang & Jennifer LeFurgy, Boomburb “Buildout”: The 
Future of Development in Large, Fast-Growing Suburbs, 42 URB. AFF. REV. 533, 
533–34 (2007). 
 23. See Owens, supra note 9, at 357–58. 
 24. See ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & ALAN BERUBE, CONFRONTING SUBURBAN 
POVERTY IN AMERICA 2 (reprt. ed. 2014); THOMAS J. VICINO, TRANSFORMING RACE 
AND CLASS IN SUBURBIA: DECLINE IN METROPOLITAN BALTIMORE 4 (2008); John 
Rennie Short et al., The Decline of Inner Suburbs: The New Suburban Gothic in the 
United States, 1 GEOGRAPHY COMPASS 641, 642 (2007). 
 25. Bernadette Hanlon et al., The New Metropolitan Reality in the U.S.: 
Rethinking the Traditional Model, 43 URB. STUD. 2129, 2138 (2006); see KNEEBONE 
& BERUBE, supra note 24, at 9. 
 26. See RICHARD FRY & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW RES. CTR., THE RISE OF 
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION BY INCOME 4 (2012), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8fa9/5fbbdc4772c77947205e4606a358813f8bb5.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JL6G-EPSM]; Claude S. Fischer et al., Distinguishing the 
Geographic Levels and Social Dimensions of U.S. Metropolitan Segregation, 1960–
2000, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 37, 53–54 (2004); Paul A. Jargowsky, Take the Money and 
Run: Economic Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 984, 991 
(1996); Daniel T. Lichter et al., The Geography of Exclusion: Race, Segregation, and 
Concentrated Poverty, 59 SOC. PROBLEMS 364, 378 (2012); Sean F. Reardon & 
Kendra Bischoff, Income Inequality and Income Segregation, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1092, 
1139 (2011). 
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upper-income households living in majority upper-income tracts 
doubled from 9% to 18%, compared to an increase from 23% to 25% 
in segregation of lower-income households living in majority lower-
income tracts.27 
It is unclear what is happening to the low-income households in 
these neighborhoods.  One study of racially concentrated areas of 
affluence suggested that these neighborhoods still retain substantial 
shares of low-income households.28  Even as the concentration of 
upper-income households was increasing in affluent areas, the 
number of lower-income households was growing as well: the share of 
lower-income households in majority upper-income tracts increased 
from 1% in 1980 to 2% in 2010.29 
The sorting of the rich and poor is even more pronounced between 
jurisdictions than between neighborhoods in the same city.30  The 
concentric zone model is strongly associated with the segregation of 
the affluent.31  In other words, in metropolitan areas where the 
affluent are most separated from the poor, the rich are living on land 
further from the center — for instance in suburban enclaves. 
Trajectories of neighborhood change are decidedly more varied 
than early models predicted.32  There is a tendency towards 
residential sorting and segregation, but at the same time, recent 
decades have seen the emergence of ascending neighborhoods in the 
urban core and diversifying inner-ring suburbs.33  Urban models 
emphasize change but neighborhoods are actually quite slow to 
change — neighborhoods are remarkably stable.  This is in part 
because Americans have become significantly more rooted over time.  
In any given year, almost 90% of the residents lived in the same house 
the year before.34  The annual mover rate for owner-occupied housing 
is 5.1%, versus 24.9% for renters.35 
 
 27. FRY & TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 1. 
 28. See generally Edward G. Goetz et al., Racially Concentrated Areas of 
Affluence: A Preliminary Investigation, 21 CITYSCAPE 99 (2019). 
 29. FRY & TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 13. 
 30. See Reardon & Bischoff, supra note 26, at 1125. 
 31. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 129. 
 32. See ROBERT E. PARK ET AL., THE CITY 51–52 (Robert E. Park & Ernest W. 
Burgess eds., 1967); Owens, supra note 9, at 363. 
 33. See Hanlon et al., supra note 25, at 2140. 
 34. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, About 36 Million Americans Moved in 
the Last Year, Census Bureau Reports (Nov. 18, 2013), 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2013/cb13-192.html 
[https://perma.cc/9UX3-97QU]. 
 35. Id. 
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B. The Role of Policy 
Neighborhood changes emerge in part from changing preferences, 
but policies to support income-diverse or integrated neighborhoods 
play a role as well.36  The public interest in supporting integration 
stems from federal civil rights enforcement, particularly in the area of 
fair housing.37  But substantial literature demonstrates the costs of 
segregation and the benefits of income mixing.38  Underlying this 
approach is the notion, advanced originally by New York urbanist 
Jane Jacobs, that the mixture of household types, tenures, and 
incomes that create income diversity are vital components of 
neighborhood revitalization.39  Such an income mix can also serve to 
break up or prevent concentrations of poverty that are viewed as 
generators of neighborhood decline.40  Good social services, 
especially education and safety, are easier to provide in communities 
with more fiscal capacity to pay for such services.41  Everyone in the 
community benefits from better services.  Low-income families 
benefit, just like middle-class families, when there are reductions in 
crime rates, and their children benefit from access to higher quality 
education.42 
Mixed-income neighborhoods arguably create an environment 
where the poor are not as segregated from the mainstream as they are 
in neighborhoods with a concentration of poverty.43  Middle-income 
residents bring resources that augment the quality of local schools, 
parks, and other amenities, helping low-income residents to acquire 
the skills needed to break away from poor communities, and thus 
reducing social costs down the road.44  Income-diverse communities 
 
 36. See CHAPPLE, supra note 21, at 119–24. 
 37. See EDWARD G. GOETZ, THE ONE-WAY STREET OF INTEGRATION: FAIR 
HOUSING AND THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN CITIES 93 (2018). 
 38. See James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty, The New Imperative for Equality, in 
SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 26–27 (James H. Carr & Nandinee 
K. Kutty eds., 2008); PETER DREIER ET AL., PLACE MATTERS: METROPOLITICS FOR 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 62–96 (3d ed. 2014); George C. Galster, Polarization, 
Race, and Place, in RACE, POVERTY, AND AMERICAN CITIES,  216–17 (John C. Boger 
& Judith W. Wegner eds., 1996). 
 39. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 148–51 
(1961). 
 40. See Christopher Jencks & Susan E. Mayer, The Social Consequences of 
Growing Up in a Poor Neighborhood, in INNER-CITY POVERTY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 177 (L. E. Lynn & M. F. H. McGeary eds., 1990). 
 41. See DREIER ET AL., supra note 38, at 185. 
 42. See id. at 82, 96. 
 43. See id. at 284–86. 
 44. See id. at 287. 
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may also be better equipped to avoid and withstand periods of decline 
than low-income communities because of their diversity of housing 
options and established economic base.45 
A wide range of initiatives, from efforts by the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to integrate subsidized 
housing,46 to regional fair share housing,47 to inclusionary zoning,48 
have been used to promote mixed-income communities.  Assessments 
indicate that these approaches have generally fallen short of their 
implementation goals and, even when enacted, may not improve life 
outcomes for the disadvantaged.49  One important precedent was the 
Gautreaux lawsuits, starting in the late 1960s, which questioned the 
legality of mobility programs that aimed to relocate public housing 
residents to mixed-race and mixed-income neighborhoods.50  These 
mobility programs operated under the premise that diversifying a 
person’s environment would give access to advantages not available 
in public housing, and adopted two approaches.51  The first, the 
“development” strategy, attracts market-rate tenants to redeveloped 
HUD-managed properties to create mixed-income communities.52  
The HOPE VI program (running from 1992 to 2011), which 
redeveloped public housing projects as new mixed-income 
developments, grew out of this approach.53  In contrast, the 
“dispersal” or “mobility” strategy grants tenants Section 8 vouchers 
so that they could move into market-rate housing in the 
neighborhood of their choice, provided that landlords would accept 
 
 45. See ALAN BERUBE, MIXED COMMUNITIES IN ENGLAND: A U.S. PERSPECTIVE 
ON EVIDENCE AND POLICY PROSPECTS 39–40 (2005). 
 46. See DRIER ET AL., supra note 38, at 159. 
 47. See id. at 262–63. 
 48. See CHAPPLE, supra note 21, at 82. 
 49. See id. at 239. 
 50. There were a number of Gautreaux decisions; in one of the first, Gautreaux v. 
Chicago Housing Authority, an Illinois federal district court found that the Chicago 
Housing Authority discriminated based on race in the placement and leasing of 
public housing. 269 F. Supp. 907, 908 (N.D. Ill. 1969) aff’d 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 
1970). In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Hills v. Gautreaux that remedial 
mobility programs — court orders that provided Section 8 vouchers for public 
housing residents to move to predominantly white neighborhoods to address CHA’s 
discriminatory policies — were constitutional. 425 U.S. 284, 297 (1976). 
 51. See CHAPPLE, supra note 21, at 119. 
 52. See EDWARD G. GOETZ, CLEARING THE WAY: DECONCENTRATING THE POOR 
IN URBAN AMERICA 58 (2003). 
 53. CHAPPLE, supra note 21, at 126. Over the duration of the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development’s HOPE VI program, it made 515 grants, worth 
over $6 billion, to replace about 83,000 housing units with a mixture of market-rate 
and subsidized housing. Id. 
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the voucher.54  This became the basis of the Moving to Opportunity 
experiment, which was designed to relocate residents living in 
neighborhoods with a concentration of poverty, as well as the eleven 
consent decrees that followed the Gautreaux decision.55 
Another set of initiatives have sought to promote the integration of 
low-income housing into wealthier, high-opportunity neighborhoods.  
These follow in part from the New Jersey case Southern Burlington 
County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel, which called for municipalities 
to provide their fair share of their region’s housing needs.56  Regional 
fair share programs increase affordable housing opportunities 
throughout a region, typically based on an allocation formula set by a 
regional authority.57  Many municipalities have adopted inclusionary 
zoning ordinances,58 but the number of affordable housing units 
produced is quite small.  In the 40 years of the program leading up to 
2010, inclusionary zoning produced an average of about 4000 units 
per year across the entire country.59 
Rent stabilization ordinances may also act as a tool to promote 
income mixing.  Studies to date have not focused on this aspect of 
rent regulations, but there exists some evidence that cities with rent 
stabilization can preserve their income diversity and community 
stability.60  Rent stabilization may spur gentrification, as landlords 
seeking to profit in a hot market may try to remove their units from 
regulation by evicting tenants and/or converting rental units to 
 
 54. See GOETZ, supra note 52, at 51. 
 55. See Susan J. Popkin et al., Obstacles to Desegregating Public Housing: 
Lessons Learned from Implementing Eight Consent Decrees, J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 179, 179–99 (2003). The Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program was 
authorized in 1992 and was modeled after Gautreaux but differed in that it was 
designed to relocate residents living in neighborhoods with a concentration of 
poverty rather than racial concentrations. The program relocated residents living in 
areas with greater than 40% of residents below the federal poverty level to areas 
where less than 10% of the population was below the federal poverty level. For a 
detailed description of all these programs, see GOETZ, supra note 52, at 45–63. 
 56. 456 A.2d 390, 478 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1983). 
 57. See Edward G. Goetz et al., The Minnesota Land Use Planning Act and the 
Promotion of Low- and Moderate-Income Housing in Suburbia, 22 LAW & INEQ. 31, 
34–39 (2004). 
 58. Inclusionary zoning ordinances ask or require developers to provide a certain 
proportion of affordable housing units within a development or provide funds in lieu. 
See LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE: AFFORDABLE HOUSING, SOCIAL INCLUSION, AND LAND VALUE 
RECAPTURE 1 (Nico Calavita & Alan Mallach eds., 2010). 
 59. For measurements and calculations, see id. at 15–78. 
 60. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 16. 
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condominiums.61  As supply tightens, local rents may increase.  This 
may still lead the remaining tenants to stay in place longer than they 
would have (presumably due to reduced supply and improved local 
amenities), stabilizing some communities.62  Residents of rent 
stabilized apartments are 10–20% more likely to stay in their housing 
long-term.63  Even when not facing drastically rising rents or market 
pressures, benefits accrue to staying in a home longer.  One study 
found that tenants without rent regulations had a discount of 12.7–
21.7% for staying in their homes, and tenants in rent-stabilized units 
had a discount of 26.5–30.9%.64 
Affordability benefits of rent stabilization may even spill over for 
units not in eligible buildings.  Studies have found that rent 
regulations are associated with either slightly decreased rents or no 
effect on non-stabilized units.65  Cities with rent regulations in New 
Jersey and California were found to have lower growth in median 
rents than cities without regulations.66  In Massachusetts, rent 
stabilized units were shown to slightly decrease rents of non-
controlled units.67 
Moderate rent stabilization measures tend to exempt new 
construction.68  Because of this, rent stabilization does not 
significantly impact new construction, after controlling for related 
characteristics.69  A study of New Jersey municipalities, with and 
without rent stabilization measures, found that the measures did not 
have a significant impact on appreciation or foreclosure rates, allaying 
concerns about disinvestment in low-income areas.70  Other studies 
demonstrate that in hot real estate markets, with wealthy incoming 
tenants, tenant protections may generate increased demand for new 
 
 61. Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 2. 
 62. PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 16. 
 63. Id. at 4. 
 64. W. A. V. Clark & Allan D. Heskin, The Impact of Rent Control on Tenure 
Discounts and Residential Mobility, 58 LAND ECON. 109, 111 (1982). 
 65. Edward L. Glaeser, Does Rent Control Reduce Segregation?, 10 SWEDISH 
ECON. POL’Y REV. 173, 197 (2003); David P. Sims, Out of Control: What Can We 
Learn from the End of Massachusetts Rent Control?, 61 J. URB. ECON. 129, 148–49 
(2007). 
 66. Glaeser, supra note 65, at 196. 
 67. Sims, supra note 65, at 148–49. 
 68. PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 14. 
 69. Id.; John I. Gilderbloom & Lin Ye, Thirty Years of Rent Control: A Survey of 
New Jersey Cities, 29 J. URB. AFF. 207, 214 (2007). 
 70. Joshua D. Ambrosius et al., Forty Years of Rent Control: Reexamining New 
Jersey’s Moderate Local Policies after the Great Recession, 49 CITIES: INT’L J. URB. 
POL’Y & PLAN. 121, 131 (2015). 
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construction.  By protecting lower-income renters who stay in their 
homes, wealthy tenants drive demand for, and are able to afford, new 
construction.71 
II. UNDERSTANDING HOUSING OPTIONS THROUGH A MORE 
EXPANSIVE VIEW OF TENURE 
Part II first defines housing tenure.  It then examines the nature 
and prevalence of different types of tenure in the New York 
metropolitan region, detailing programs in New York City as well as 
regulations in other jurisdictions.  These different types of tenure 
include informal tenures, affordability-protected rentals, open-market 
rentals, third way tenures, homeownership, and mixed tenures. 
Discussions of housing tenure, traditionally referring to the 
arrangement of housing ownership and occupancy, are often viewed 
in terms of a simple dichotomy of renting versus ownership.72  Tenure 
can take a range of different forms, including mixed-tenure housing.73  
Tenure offers a useful dimension for mapping the domain of housing 
options, as moving beyond the original notion of tenure gives insight 
into the amount of stability and control a resident has over their living 
situation.74  Many forms of tenure are insecure, such as when renters 
are not formally on the lease or where renters are unprotected from 
potentially drastic rises in rents.75  Other forms of tenure carry 
affordability protections, and there is a small but growing 
development of “third way tenures,” involving cooperatives and 
 
 71. PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 14 n.12 (citing the opinion of Berkeley 
Housing Director Dr. Stephen Barton). 
 72. See generally Jake Wegmann et al., Breaking the Double Impasse: Securing 
and Supporting Diverse Housing Tenures in the United States, 27 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE 193 (2017); see also James Barlow & Simon Duncan, The Use and Abuse of 
Housing Tenure, 3 HOUSING STUD. 219, 220 (1988) (describing and critiquing the 
term in more depth). 
 73. See Barlow & Duncan, supra note 72, at 219 (describing tenure having more 
than its original meaning of occupancy and homeownership); see also Wegmann et 
al., supra note 72, at 10 (advocating for a more expansive definition of the range of 
tenure types). 
 74. See ANNA CASH, U.C. BERKELEY, HOW IS OAKLAND LIVING? A TENURE 
DIVERSITY ANALYSIS 10 (2018), 
http://www.urbandisplacement.org/sites/default/files/images/oakland_tenure_diversit
y_analysis_report_final_cash_051118.pdf [https://perma.cc/HHU5-H66D] (citing 
Wegmann et al., supra note 72). 
 75. See Wegmann et al., supra note 72 (describing the concept of high-risk 
tenures). This Article’s definition of “tenure” is based on Wegmann et al.’s 
conception of high-risk tenures. 
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community land trusts.76  Examples of each tenure type are shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Forms of Tenure77 
 
 
Central to conversations about housing and tenure is the question 
of affordability: What housing is affordable, and to whom?  Housing 
can become insecure by not being affordable to a household.  Both 
owning and renting can include ranges of affordability, although 
affordable housing is often assumed to refer only to rental housing.78  
The classic reason for this distinction is the capital required for a 
mortgage and the capital gains homeowners are able to accrue 
 
 76. Traditional “third sector” or “third way” housing was defined as common 
property regimes, including cooperatives and community land trusts. CHARLES 
GEISLER & GAIL DANEKER, PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP xiv (Charles Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000). 
 77. See Wegmann et al., supra note 72, at 193–216 (describing concept of high-risk 
tenure); see also CASH, supra note 74, at 23–28; supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 78. John M. Quigley & Steven Raphael, Is Housing Unaffordable? Why Isn’t It 
More Affordable?, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 192 (2004). 
Form of Tenure Examples 
Informal tenures 
Tenant not on lease; transitional 
housing; living on street 
Affordability-
protected rentals 
Rent controlled units; units under rent 
stabilization measures; public housing 
Open-market rentals 
Rental units in municipalities that do 
not have rent stabilization; units built 
recently; single-family rental homes (in 
most areas) 
Third way tenures Community land trusts; cooperatives 
Homeownership Owner-occupied homes 
Mixed-tenure 
Accessory Dwelling Units; rental units 
in owner-occupied buildings
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through property ownership.79  This then drives societal inequality.  
For instance, historic redlining and racial discrimination in access to 
mortgages and other loans resulted in the inability of people of color 
to purchase property and attain the gains that white homeowners 
were able to accrue, which contributes significantly to the racial 
wealth gap.80  HUD estimates a rent to be affordable if it is less than 
30% of a household’s annual gross income, and households paying 
more than 50% of their income in rent are considered to be severely 
rent burdened.81  Homeowners are also considered to be cost-
burdened if they pay more than 30% of their income on housing costs, 
including mortgages.82 
A. Informal Tenures 
Informal tenures encompass the most insecure forms of housing 
and include those without a formal lease in a resident’s name or 
without access to housing.83  The most vulnerable are those unhoused, 
in shelters, or on the street.84  New York City has over 3000 street 
homeless, and roughly 60,000 people living in shelters — the largest 
population in the country.85  A wide range of other living 
arrangements, often undercounted and unprotected, fall under this 
umbrella as well, including short-term rentals, informal tenants, 
transitional housing, and informal live-work arrangements.86  Other 
forms of informal tenures include crowding, defined by the New York 
 
 79. Peter Saunders, Domestic Property and Social Class, 2 INT’L J. URB. & 
REGIONAL RES. 233, 233–34 (1978). 
 80. Dalton Conley, Decomposing the Black-White Wealth Gap: The Role of 
Parental Resources, Inheritance, and Investment Dynamics, 71 SOC. INQUIRY 39, 39 
(2001). 
 81. NICOLE E. WATSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., WORST CASE 
HOUSING NEEDS 2017: REPORT TO CONGRESS 1, 2, 15 (2017). 
 82. MARY SCHWARTZ & ELLEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO CAN 
AFFORD TO LIVE IN A HOME? A LOOK AT DATA FROM THE 2006 AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY SURVEY 1 (2008), 
https://www.census.gov/housing/census/publications/who-can-afford.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/29YC-5RHD]. 
 83. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 84. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Press Release, NYC Dep’t of Homeless Services, Survey Estimates Six 
Percent Fewer Homeless New Yorkers on the Streets (June 19, 2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/dhs/about/press-releases/hope-2018-results-release.page 
[https://perma.cc/YDK8-5622]; Nikita Stewart, Long Nights with Little Sleep for 
Homeless Families Seeking Shelter, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29/nyregion/long-nights-with-little-sleep-for-
homeless-families-seeking-shelter.html [https://perma.cc/W5QN-9CCK]. 
 86. See Wegmann et al., supra note 72, at 24. 
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City Housing and Vacancy Survey as more than one person per room 
on average, for all rooms in a unit.87  In 2017, 11.5% of renter 
households in the city were crowded under this definition.88 
B. Affordability-Protected Rentals 
The New York metropolitan region is home to a wide variety of 
subsidized rental tenures, supported by federal, state, and city 
subsidies as well as rent control and rent stabilization measures.  The 
term “affordability protection” is used in this Article to define 
housing that has some legal regulation providing a constraint on the 
rent, through direct subsidies or prohibiting a level of increase.89  
Moreover, the term “protection” is used to encompass rent 
stabilization and rent control, and retain focus on the impact on 
residents.  In the New York metropolitan region, affordability 
protections are typically rental protections, though there are 
affordable homeownership programs run by the city and state.90 
i. Rent Stabilization and Rent Control 
The most widespread affordability protections in the New York 
metropolitan region are rent regulations.91  More than half of the 
region’s rental units are located in New York City,92 but restrictions 
in rent regulations mean that many of these units are exempt from 
rent stabilization protections, due to high rents or being located in 
 
 87. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., SELECTED INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE 
2017 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY 8 (2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/about/2017-hvs-initial-
findings.pdf[https://perma.cc/FMF4-Z6PZ]. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Wegmann et al., supra note 72, at 20 (describing affordability 
protections). Wegmann et al.’s description informs this Article’s definition of 
“affordability protection.” 
 90. Opportunities for Homeowners and Homebuyers, N.Y.C. DEP’T HOUSING 
PRESERVATION & DEV., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/owners/homeownership-
opportunities.page [https://perma.cc/F7GV-V8YU] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019); 
Affordable Housing Corporation, N.Y. ST. AFFORDABLE HOUSING CORP., 
https://hcr.ny.gov/affordable-housing-corporation-0 [https://perma.cc/B3NP-8SZ8] 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
 91. See NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL, RENT CONTROL BY STATE LAW 
(2019), https://www.nmhc.org/link/049fe4e913c24234b8d9fe0be2d6a40b.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/JLR5-LDND]. However, this does not mean that half of rental units 
in the region are covered, due to specifications of the rent stabilization laws. 
 92. Authors’ analysis of U.S. Census data, infra Part III.A. 
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small buildings.93  In 2017, just 44% of New York City’s rental units 
were rent stabilized.94  New York’s rent stabilization is maintained 
through the Emergency Tenant Protection Act, which is renewed 
every three years while the city is considered to be under a housing 
emergency (with a vacancy rate below 5%).95  These units are 
protected from open market increases on rents: as of 2018, increases 
are allowed by the Rent Guidelines Board at the rate of 1.5% for one-
year leases and 2.5%for two-year leases.96  These regulations provide 
stability: the median contract rent for rent stabilized units increased 
by 2.6% from 2014 to 2017, while the median contract rent for private 
non-regulated units increased by 10% in that time period.97 
There are two primary limitations on rent stabilization in New 
York City.  First, rent stabilization most typically covers units in 
buildings of six or more units built between February 1947 and 
December 1973.98  There are a few additions, for buildings with 
special affordability protections through tax exemption programs,99 
certain buildings with three or more apartments constructed or 
extensively renovated on or after January 1974 with special tax 
benefits,100 and for tenants in buildings built before February 1947, 
who moved in after June 1971.101  Second, New York City has 
vacancy bonus increases and high-rent vacancy and high-income 
decontrol thresholds.  Vacancy bonus increases mean that each time a 
tenant moves out, the landlord can raise the rent by 20% (for a two-
year lease, less for a one-year lease), with small additions for 
 
 93. See N.Y. STATE DIV. OF HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, RENT STABILIZATION 
AND EMERGENCY TENANT PROTECTION ACT 1–2 (2019), https://hcr.ny.gov/rent-
stabilization-and-emergency-tenant-protection-act [https://perma.cc/X6JP-CHPN]. 
 94. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., supra note 87, at 1. 
 95. See NYU FURMAN CTR., RENT STABILIZATION IN NEW YORK CITY 1–2 
(2012). 
 96. See N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2018–19 APARTMENT & LOFT ORDER #50 
(2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/site/rentguidelinesboard/rent-guidelines/2018-19-
apartment-loft-order-50.page [https://perma.cc/6CT4-6LNP]. 
 97. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., supra note 87, at 21. 
 98. See N.Y. STATE DIV. OF HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, supra note 93. 
 99. See generally N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #1 RENT 
STABILIZATION AND RENT CONTROL (2018), 
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/03/fact-sheet-1-sj-final-12-19-18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/82M2-7EXM]. 
 100. N.Y. STATE DIV. OF HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, supra note 93. 
 101. Id. These specific dates are due to the two waves of rent regulations passed in 
New York City, the first due to migration during World War II, and the second 
during inflation in the 1970s. See Richard Arnott, Time for Revisionism on Rent 
Control?, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 100–02 (1995). 
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improvements.102  High-rent vacancy decontrol means that 
apartments are deregulated when rents rise beyond the current 
deregulation threshold of $2774.76 and there is a vacancy.103  High-
income decontrol means that if the income of residents is above 
$200,000 for each of the two prior years, and the rent of the unit is at 
or above the deregulation threshold, the unit is no longer subject to 
rent regulation.104 
High rates of rent decontrol are the primary reason for a decline in 
the number of rent-stabilized units in New York City.  The Furman 
Center found that approximately half of units in the city were rent-
regulated in 2011, with a net loss of 230,000 units over the past 30 
years, despite the entry of units due to tax incentive programs.105  Due 
to these decontrol measures, New York City has rapidly lost rent-
stabilized units: between 13,000 to 40,000 apartments are priced out of 
rent regulation each year.106 
Rent control, which is often conflated with rent stabilization, is 
more restrictive.  Rent control applies only to buildings constructed 
before February 1947, with a tenant or a lawful successor — family 
member, spouse, or adult lifetime partner — who has been living 
continuously in the apartment since before July 1971.107  When rent-
controlled apartments become vacant, they either become stabilized, 
if in an eligible building, or are removed from regulation.108  Rent-
controlled apartments only comprised approximately 1% of New 
York City’s housing stock in 2017.109 
 
 102. See N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #26 GUIDE TO RENT 
INCREASES FOR RENT STABILIZED APARTMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (2018), 
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/09/orafac26.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DWT2-MV2A]. 
 103. RENT CONTROL, supra note 99, at 4. 
 104. Id. 
 105. NYU FURMAN CTR., supra note 95, at 2. 
 106. Cara Buckley, Deal Will Make It Harder to Use Renovation to Free 
Apartments from Rent Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/nyregion/albany-deal-closes-rent-regulation-
loophole-for-landlords.html [https://perma.cc/8PRC-9NRC]. 
 107. OFFICE OF N.Y. STATE ATT’Y GEN., TENANTS’ RIGHTS GUIDE 2, 
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/tenants_rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HWE-G8DT] 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2019). 
 108. Id. 
 109. N.Y.C. DEP’T. OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., SELECTED INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE 
2017 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY 2 (2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/about/2017-hvs-initial-findings.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H36J-WG9L]. 
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Some other municipalities in the region have some form of rent 
stabilization, sometimes through an Emergency Tenant Protection 
Act similar to New York City, while other jurisdictions restrict 
municipalities from adopting these protections.110  Those with high-
rent vacancy decontrol have similar thresholds to New York City,111 
although the protections range from governing single-unit buildings in 
parts of New Jersey112 to applying only to buildings with 100 or more 
units in parts of New York.113  One of the states in the defined New 
York metropolitan region, Connecticut, currently prohibits local 
jurisdictions from adopting rent control laws.114 
ii. Federal Subsidy Programs 
Federal subsidy programs, including public housing and Housing 
Choice Vouchers, also known as Section 8 vouchers, provide for a 
significant amount of housing in the region, including over 350,000 
units in New York City.115  However, these programs do not 
necessarily prevent displacement.  Holders of Section 8 vouchers 
 
 110. NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL, supra note 91. 
 111. N.Y. STATE HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, DEREGULATION RENT AND INCOME 
THRESHOLDS (2018), 
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/10/deregulationrentincomethreshold.p
df [https://perma.cc/98UM-XKRH]. 
 112. See generally N.J. DEP’T OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, 2009 RENT CONTROL 
SURVEY (2009), 
https://www.nj.gov/dca/divisions/codes/publications/pdf_lti/rnt_cntrl_srvy_2009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q9EY-K268]. See, e.g., BOROUGH OF CHESILHURST, N.J. § 373.2 
(1989); TOWNSHIP OF EAST BRUNSWICK, N.J. § 169-1 (2005); BOROUGH OF FAIR 
LAWN, N.J. § 177-2 (1982); Landlord-Tenant Affairs, CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY, N.J., 
http://cityofatlanticcity.org/?page_id=712 [https://perma.cc/GW74-UQZ7] (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2019). 
 113. See Urgent Relief for the Homless Act : Hearing on H.R. 558 Before the 
Subcomm. on Hous. & Community Development of the H. Comm. On Banking, 
Finance & Urb. Affairs, 100th Cong. 36 (1987) (statement of Rep. Stewart B. 
McKinney). For a list of the specific New York municipalities adopting this approach, 
see N.Y. STATE CONSUMER PROT. BD., RENT SMART: A CONSUMER GUIDE TO 
LEASING AND APARTMENT OR HOUSE, 
http://www.metcouncilonhousing.org/sites/default/files/rent_smarts.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZL7S-8G2B] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). 
 114. JULIA SINGER BANSAL, CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. OFFICE OF LEGIS. RESEARCH, 
STATES AUTHORIZING RENT CONTROL 1 (2015), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2015/rpt/pdf/2015-R-0020.pdf [https://perma.cc/N69W-H9SW]. 
 115. NYU FURMAN CTR., NYCHA’S OUTSIZED ROLE IN HOUSING NEW YORK’S 
POOREST HOUSEHOLDS 1–2 (2018), http://furmancenter.org/files/NYCHA_Brief_12-
17-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9U4-34AU]. 
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often face constrained housing choices,116 despite attempts by local, 
state, and federal government to prevent discrimination.117 
Public housing units that are government built-and-operated exist 
in large numbers in the region.  The New York City Housing 
Authority (NYCHA) provides an enormous share of the affordable 
housing in the city.  In 2018, some 174,000 public units housed 
approximately 400,000 low-income New Yorkers — or, one in eleven 
renters.118  This is far more than the number supported by low-income 
housing tax credits, at approximately 116,000 units.119  Rents in public 
housing units are far more affordable than in unregulated units: 
average public housing rents were less than a third of average 
unregulated rents in New York City in 2017.120 
There was a shift in the 1960s and 70s from federal decisions to 
build public housing to subsidizing developments by private 
developers.  The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is a 
subsidy to private developers for low-income families to live in the 
private housing market.121  This is now the largest subsidy for the 
production of rental housing in the United States, allocated in the 
form of tax credits for low-income housing.122 
iii. New York City Programs 
New York City has run dozens of subsidy programs within the five 
boroughs over the decades.123  These often involve state, federal, or 
local funding (or a combination thereof), subsidizing new 
construction as well as the preservation of affordability in current 
units.124  Programs like 421-a, for example, involve tax incentives to 
 
 116. Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing Act’s New 
Frontier, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 158 (1996). 
 117. See generally Jenna Bernstein, Note, Section 8, Source of Income 
Discrimination, and Federal Preemption: Setting the Record Straight, 31 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1407, 1407–08 (2010); Derek Waller, Note, Leveraging State and Local 
Antidiscrimination Laws to Prohibit Discrimination Against Recipients of Federal 
Rental Assistance, 27 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 401, 406–15 
(2018). 
 118. NYU FURMAN CTR., supra note 115, at 1. 
 119. Id. at 2. 
 120. Id. at 3. 
 121. Robert Collinson et al., Low-Income Housing Policy 8–10 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21071, 2015). 
 122. Id. at 8. 
 123. Directory of NYC Housing Programs, NYU FURMAN CTR.: CORE 
DATA.NYC, http://furmancenter.org/coredata/directory/all [https://perma.cc/QKS9-
7F37] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 124. See id. 
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provide affordability for certain units.125  Others, like J-51, provide 
tax incentives for building renovation and refurbishment programs 
that involve affordability protections.126  Land use tools have been 
used as well, including Mandatory Inclusionary Housing, requiring 
set-asides of affordable units in higher-density developments and 
conversions.127  The City has also been using city-owned lots in 
combination with federal programs to incentivize affordable 
housing.128  Together these provide a significant share of subsidized 
units within the five boroughs, and have recently had a renewed 
emphasis under “Housing New York,” the 2014 plan to increase 
housing affordability in the city.129  Housing New York financed just 
over 135,000 units of new construction and affordability preservation 
in its first five years.130 
Most frequently, units subsidized through New York City programs 
fall under rent stabilization.131  Subsidized new construction units are 
initially leased through a lottery system, and applications require 
proof of meeting low- or middle-income cutoffs.132  These subsidized 
units are subject to the same vacancy bonus increases and high-rent 
vacancy decontrol policies as all rent-stabilized units. 
 
 125. 421-a Tax Incentive Program, NYU FURMAN CTR.: CORE DATA.NYC, 
http://furmancenter.org/coredata/directory/entry/421-a-tax-incentive 
[https://perma.cc/9PHV-5DC4] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 126. J-51 Tax Incentive, NYU FURMAN CTR.: CORE DATA.NYC, 
http://furmancenter.org/coredata/directory/entry/j-51-tax-incentive 
[https://perma.cc/GXD7-G24W] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 127. See Zoning Districts & Tools: Inclusionary Housing – DCP, NYC PLANNING, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/zoning/districts-tools/inclusionary-housing.page 
[https://perma.cc/ZZT6-NHRG] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). Of note, many other 
municipalities in the region also have inclusionary policies, most notably New Jersey 
via the Mt. Laurel decision. See Mount Laurel Doctrine, FAIR SHARE HOUSING CTR., 
http://fairsharehousing.org/mount-laurel-doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/USW5-P9CW] 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 128. See, e.g., CITY OF NEW YORK, HOUSING NEW YORK: A FIVE-BOROUGH, TEN-
YEAR PLAN 41 (2014), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/housing/downloads/pdf/housing_plan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z9U9-23NA]. 
 129. See generally id. 
 130. Housing New York, NYC HOUSING, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/housing/index.page [https://perma.cc/87MC-SH47] (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 131. See Directory of NYC Housing Programs, supra note 123. 
 132. See Find Affordable Housing Opportunities, NYC HOUSING PRESERVATION 
& DEV., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/renters/find-housing.page 
[https://perma.cc/HA43-R25T] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019); Do You Qualify?, NYC 
HOUSING PRESERVATION & DEV., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/renters/do-you-
qualify.page [https://perma.cc/PT82-Z3EL] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
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These programs are confined to the five boroughs of New York 
City.  Other jurisdictions have affordable housing programs but they 
are at a smaller scale, without New York City’s substantial funding or 
administrative capacity.133  Affordable housing is very expensive to 
build and maintain, especially in areas with high land costs.134  
Promisingly, New York State recently launched a plan to create and 
preserve affordable housing in New York City and throughout the 
state.135 
C. Open-Market Rentals 
The majority of rental units in the New York metropolitan region 
are not governed by any form of affordability protections.  Our 
conservative estimates are that 2.3 million units are not governed by 
some form of affordability protection.136 
 
 133. See, e.g., Affordable Housing, CITY OF JERSEY CITY, N.J., 
https://www.jerseycitynj.gov/cms/one.aspx?pageId=12682850 
[https://perma.cc/8KXQ-VUHE] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 134. CAROLINA REID & HAYLEY RAETZ, TERNER CTR. FOR HOUS. INNOVATION, 
PERSPECTIVES: PRACTITIONERS WEIGH IN ON DRIVERS OF RISING HOUSING 
CONSTRUCTION COSTS IN SAN FRANCISCO (2018), 
https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/uploads/San_Francisco_Construction_Cost_Brief_-
_Terner_Center_January_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST9J-BLUQ]. 
 135. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, “Governor Cuomo Launches 
Landmark $20 Billion Plan to Combat Homelessness and Create Affordable Housing 
for All New Yorkers” (May 18, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-
cuomo-launches-landmark-20-billion-plan-combat-homelessness-and-create-
affordable [https://perma.cc/GPK2-Y8SW]. 
 136. This value was calculated by subtracting the number of rent stabilized and 
rent controlled units in New York City and the approximate number of units under 
rental protections in the rest of the New York metropolitan region from the total 
number of rental units in the New York metropolitan region. The value for the 
number of rent stabilized and rent controlled units in New York City was from the 
2011 Furman Center Report on the Housing and Vacancy Survey. See NYU FURMAN 
CTR., PROFILE OF RENT-STABILIZED UNITS AND TENANTS IN NEW YORK CITY (2014) 
[hereinafter FURMAN CTR., 2011 SURVEY], 
https://furmancenter.org/files/FurmanCenter_FactBrief_RentStabilization_June2014.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZJD-CT63]. The estimated number of units under rental 
protections in the rest of the New York metropolitan region was calculated as the 
total number of units in municipalities with some form of rent stabilization measures. 
Municipalities were listed in Jim Lapides et al., Rent Control Laws by State Chart 
(2019). See Jim Lapides et al., Rent Control Laws by State Chart, NAT’L 
MULTIFAMILY HOUSING COUNCIL (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.nmhc.org/research-
insight/analysis-and-guidance/rent-control-laws-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/4SR8-
VE22]. Rental unit numbers were from the U.S. Census Bureau, 2012–2016 
American Community Survey 5-year estimates (2017)., U.S. Census Bureau 2012–
2016 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates [hereinafter Census 2012–2016 
5-Year Estimates] , SOC. EXPLORER, 
https://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/ACS2016_5yr (last visited Oct. 18, 2019). 
2019] REVISITING RENT STABILIZATION 1159 
Some of the rents in open-market units are affordable to 
households, at less than 30% of their household incomes, and may be 
below market rate.  However, tenants have no protections against 
rapid rent increases by landlords, making them particularly 
vulnerable to displacement.  Stabilized units have lower rents overall 
than those on the open market in New York City.137 
D. Third Way Tenures 
“Third way” tenures refer to joint forms of ownership among 
residents, such as community land trusts.138  The majority of New 
York City’s subsidized housing programs are for renters, but the city 
also has two subsidized housing programs which offer 
homeownership at reduced rates — Mitchell Lama co-ops and 
Housing Development Fund Corporation (HDFC) co-ops.139  Both of 
these programs have income limits.140  Mitchell Lama units, created 
out of a city-state program, have long multi-year waiting lists, with 
many waiting lists within the New York metropolitan region closed.141  
New York State has about 35 of these developments beyond New 
York City limits but the majority are within the five boroughs.142  
Some Mitchell Lamas are rentals, though most are cooperative 
ownership.143  Data on third way tenures is not systematically 
gathered on a national level, but the New York City Housing and 
 
 137. FURMAN CTR., 2011 SURVEY, supra note 136. 
 138. CHARLES GEISLER & GAIL DANEKER, PROPERTY AND VALUES: 
ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP xiv (2000) (defining traditional 
“third sector” or “third way” housing as common property regimes, including 
cooperatives and community land trusts). 
 139. See Mitchell-Lama, NYC HOUSING PRESERVATION & DEV., 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/renters/mitchell-lama.page [https://perma.cc/GP8V-
KJ3U] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019); HDFC Cooperatives, NYC HOUSING 
PRESERVATION & DEV. https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/owners/homeowner-hdfc.page 
[https://perma.cc/8NX5-HMYU] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019). 
 140. Fact Sheet for Cooperative HDFC Shareholders, CITY OF NEW YORK, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/Owners/hdfc-coop-fact-sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9FFY-42UY] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019); Mitchell Lama Applicant 
Information, N.Y. HOMES & COMMUNITY RENEWAL, https://hcr.ny.gov/mitchell-
lama-applicant-information [https://perma.cc/7HG9-RS6P] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 141. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 142. See CITY OF NEW YORK, MITCHELL-LAMA LISTING, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/renters-mitchell-lama/MLLIST.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3S6X-VFKZ] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019). 
 143. See id. 
1160 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
Vacancy Survey reports that there were approximately 300,000 units 
of co-op housing in New York City in 2017.144 
E. Mixed-Tenure 
Mixed-tenure solutions include all forms of tenure that involve a 
mixture of renting and owning on the same property, and therefore 
provide a different balance of protection depending on the resident in 
question.  For example, a renter in an owner-occupied building may 
not have as much stability or protection from increases in housing 
costs as the homeowner, despite living on the same premises. 
Accessory Dwelling Units (ADUs) — additional smaller houses on 
the same property as another residential building, often with mixed 
tenureship on the land parcel — have been slow to be legalized in the 
New York metropolitan region.145  New York State allows 
municipalities to form their own laws around the matter.146  
Researchers in Long Island found that about 2% of single-family 
homes, or about 16,000 units, have a legal ADU.147 
F. Homeownership 
Finally, over one-half of units in the New York metropolitan region 
are owned rather than rented (53%).148  This percentage has increased 
slightly over time: 51% of units were owned in 1990, and 53% were in 
2016.149  This categorization includes a range of types and 
characteristics, from single-family detached houses to condominiums 
in multi-story buildings.150  In the New York metropolitan region, the 
vast majority of owner-occupied units are single-family homes 
 
 144. See N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2018 HOUSING SUPPLY REPORT 4 (2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/18HSR.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/645V-VUN5]. 
 145. See VICKI BEEN ET AL., NYU FURMAN CTR., RESPONDING TO CHANGING 
HOUSEHOLDS: REGULATORY CHALLENGES FOR MICRO-UNITS AND ACCESSORY 
DWELLING UNITS 34–36 (2014); KAREN CHAPPLE ET AL., JUMPSTARTING THE 
MARKET FOR ACCESSORY DWELLING UNITS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM PORTLAND, 
SEATTLE AND VANCOUVER 4 (2017);  
 146. See N.Y. MULT. DWELL. § 3 (1983). 
 147. See CHRISTOPHER NIEDT & KATRIN B. ANACKER, HOFSTRA UNIV., 
ACCESSORY DWELLINGS ON LONG ISLAND: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2016), 
https://issuu.com/hofstra/docs/adu_report_posted [https://perma.cc/W3V9-QGUE]. 
 148. Census 2012–2016 5-Year Estimates, supra note 136. 
 149. Id.; U.S. Census Bureau 1990 Decennial Census [hereinafter 1990 Census], 
SOC. EXPLORER, https://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/RC1990 (last visited Oct. 18, 
2019).  Note: this statistic refers to the total percent of residents in the region owning 
or renting at each time period. 
 150. 1990 Census, supra note 149; Census 2012–2016 5-Year Estimates  
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(78%).151  While data on condominiums is not readily available for the 
entire New York metropolitan region, in New York City there were 
approximately 116,000 owner-occupied condominiums compared to 
about 600,000 owner-occupied conventional homes.152 
Owner-occupied units do not guarantee stability: the 2008 housing 
crisis resulted in four million foreclosures across the United States 
from 2008–2011.153  Homeownership is particularly risky for low-
income homeowners.  Several studies show that nearly half of low-
income homebuyers return to renting within five years of purchasing 
a home.154 
Despite the risks, homeownership is still associated with more 
stability than renting market-rate units is.155  Tax and fiscal policy 
prioritize the stability of homeowners, through tax deductions on 
retirement accounts and home mortgage interest, without equivalent 
protections for lower-income renters.156  Ultimately, scholars have 
described this as the “hidden welfare state.”157 
PART III: NEIGHBORHOOD TYPES AND WHERE LOW-INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS LIVE 
Determining the relationship between neighborhood change and 
rent stabilization ordinances requires multiple steps of data 
preparation.  For this analysis, this Article used the 31-county New 
York metropolitan region as defined by the Regional Plan 
Association, extending across three states: New York, Connecticut, 
 
 151. Analysis from ACS 2017 data: U.S. Census Bureau, 2013-2017 American 
Community Survey 5-year Estimates, SOC. EXPLORER (2018) [hereinafter Census 
20132017 5-Year Estimates], https://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/ACS2017_5yr. 
 152. See N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., supra note 144, at 4. Questions about co-
ops and condominiums were not asked on the 2017 U.S. Census American 
Community Survey. 
 153. WILLIAM M. ROHE & MARK LINDBLAD, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, 
HARVARD UNIV., REEXAMINING THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP AFTER 
THE HOUSING CRISIS 2 (2013). 
 154. See THOMAS P. BOEHM & ALAN M. SCHLOTTMAN, WEALTH ACCUMULATION 
AND HOMEOWNERSHIP: EVIDENCE FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 33 (2004); C.E. 
Herbert & E.S. Belsky, The Homeownership Experience of Low-Income and 
Minority Households: A Review and Synthesis of the Literature, 10 CITYSCAPE 2, 18 
(2008); Carolina Katz Reid, Achieving the American Dream? A Longitudinal 
Analysis of the Homeowner Experiences of Low-Income Households 19 (Ctr. for 
Soc. Dev., Working Paper 05-20, 2005). 
 155. Rohe & Lindblad, supra note 153, at 44. 
 156. See CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX 
EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 17–18, 28 (1999). 
 157. See id. at 17–18. 
1162 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
and New Jersey.158  Part III first describes this data preparation 
process and then presents the results of the analysis: a typology of 
eight different forms of neighborhood change. 
A. Data and Methods 
The first step in the analysis is designating neighborhoods by their 
stage of change over time.  For this, data from the Decennial Census, 
collected in 1990 and 2000, and the American Community Survey 
from 2012 to 2016 was used.159  To reconcile the changes in tract 
boundaries from earlier time periods, this Article used Brown 
University’s Longitudinal Tract Database (LTDB) and its crosswalks, 
which normalize census tract data from each year to 2010 census tract 
boundaries to maximize comparability across the study period.160  
Where variables are not provided by the LTDB,161 the original raw 
data was downloaded and normalized using LTDB’s crosswalk. 
Change in both low- and high-income neighborhoods was 
characterized — looking at gentrification and displacement in the 
former and exclusion in the latter.  Thus, the region was divided into 
low-income neighborhoods at less than 80% of area regional median 
household income, and moderate- to high-income neighborhoods 
with median income at or above 80% of area regional median 
household income.  These thresholds were selected to be consistent 
with affordable housing policies and programs.162  Tracts with 
populations of over 500 were also selected, primarily because of data 
reliability issues. 
To describe the neighborhoods where gentrification and 
displacement are taking place, most studies first pinpoint the 
 
 158. See Where We Work, REGIONAL PLAN. ASS’N, http://www.rpa.org 
[https://perma.cc/GNM8-DB2H] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019). 
 159. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DECENNIAL CENSUS (1990, 2000); U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (2012-2016). 
 160. See John R. Logan et al., Interpolating U.S. Decennial Census Tract Data 
from as Early as 1970 to 2010: A Longitudinal Tract Database, 66 PROF. 
GEOGRAPHER 412, 417 (2014). 
 161. The variables missing from the LTDB included household income distribution 
and number of low-income households moving into a census tract. These were 
downloaded instead via Social Explorer, http://www.socialexplorer.com. 
 162. HUD has established income limits to determine the income eligibility of 
applicants for subsidized housing subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1437b(2)(a) (2016); Income 
Limits, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING. & URBAN DEV. OFF. POL’Y DEV. & RES., 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il.html#2016 [https://perma.cc/P25Q-3CW7] 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2019). 
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neighborhoods with potential to change (or the “eligible” tracts).163  
To do this here, several different indicators were used.  At the most 
basic level, vulnerability to change is defined by concentration of 
affordable housing,164 so neighborhoods where either rents or housing 
values are below the regional median were selected.  Also selected 
were several other demographic characteristics — college education 
below the regional median, share of low-income households above 
the regional median, share of renters above the regional median, and 
share of nonwhite households above the regional median.  The results 
of this study suggested that “eligible” neighborhoods must have 
housing affordability plus any three of the four demographic 
characteristics. 
Next, neighborhood change was characterized in the form of 
gentrification, operationalized as the influx of investment and people 
into low-income areas, and displacement, the loss of low-income 
households without replacement, in low-income areas.  Exclusion, by 
this Article’s definition, transpires when displacement occurs in high-
income neighborhoods.  Thus, gentrification was measured via the 
change in real median housing value or rent — depending on whether 
the neighborhood is majority owner or renter — above the regional 
median change, as well as growth in share of college educated 
population and household median income greater than the regional 
median change.  To measure displacement and exclusion, two 
indicators were used: absolute loss of low-income households 
between census years and decrease in the in-migration rate of low-
income households. 
Finally, two additional neighborhood types were created.  For a set 
of neighborhoods that have not yet gentrified but also exhibit both 
vulnerability and a real estate market that is heating up, we use the 
designation “at risk of gentrification.”  For all neighborhoods, 
whether gentrifying or exclusionary, where the median income is 
more than two times the regional median of $70,000, a category 
“super gentrification or exclusion” was created. 
 
 163. See KAREN CHAPPLE ET AL., U.C. BERKELEY & UCLA, DEVELOPING A NEW 
METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING DISPLACEMENT 66 (2017), 
https://www.urbandisplacement.org/sites/default/files/images/arb_tod_report_13-
310.pdf [https://perma.cc/TH6S-ATHD]. 
 164. See Neil Smith, Toward a Theory of Gentrification: A Back to the City 
Movement by Capital, Not People, 45 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 538, 545 (1979) 
(characterizing this as the rent gap, or the difference between a housing unit’s current 
rent and the potential rental income under market conditions). A simple proxy, 
whether a census tract’s median home value or rent is less than 80% of the regional 
median, was used to identify this affordable housing stock. 
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B. Results 
Table 2 explains the classification system.  Figures 1 and 2 map the 
results of this analysis and describe change over time at the 
neighborhood level.165  The maps identify historic change and predict 
areas likely to change in the future.  Overall, of the 5294 census tracts 
in the 31-county region, 7% have already gentrified, 5% are currently 
undergoing gentrification, 9% are currently undergoing displacement, 
14% are in some stage of exclusion, 6% are in super gentrification or 
exclusion, and 10% are at risk of gentrification.  The remaining 48% 
of tracts may be considered stable.  This typology depicts 
neighborhood change over a 26-year period and uses the patterns 
from 1990 to 2016 to predict long-term change.     
 
 
  
 
 165. Analysis by the authors is based on the New York dataset. See Miriam Zuk & 
Karen Chapple, Mapping Displacement and Gentrification in the New York 
Metropolitan Area, URB. DISPLACEMENT PROJECT (July 27, 2019) [hereinafter 
Chapple, Mapping NY], https://www.urbandisplacement.org/maps/ny 
[https://perma.cc/XZG9-QQPG]; Region defined as 31-county New York 
metropolitan region.  Categorization of Income Levels (in terms of Area Median 
Income): Low Income = Below 80%, Moderate to High Income = 80–199%, Very 
High Income = 200% or Higher. See infra Appendix 1. 
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Table 2. Neighborhood Change Typologies for the New York 
Metropolitan Region 
 
Displacement and Gentrification Census Tract Typologies 
Typology (tract income level) Typology Criteria 
Not Losing Low-Income 
Households (Low Income) 
 Population in 2000 >500 
 Low Income Tract in 2016 
 Not classified as At Risk or Ongoing Gentrification or 
Displacement 
At Risk of Gentrification 
(Low Income) 
 Population in 2016 > 500 
 Low Income Tract in 2016 
 Vulnerable in 2016 (Defined in Appendix) 
 “Hot market” from 2000 to 2016 
 Not currently undergoing displacement or ongoing 
gentrification 
Ongoing 
Displacement of 
Low-Income 
Households (Low 
Income) 
 Population in 2000 > 500 
 Low Income Tract in 2016 
 Loss of Low-Income households 2000-2016 (absolute 
loss) 
 Few signs of gentrification occurring 
Ongoing Gentrification  
(Low Income) 
 Population in 2000 or 2016 > 500 
 Low Income Tract in 2016 
 Gentrified in 1990-2000 or 2000-2016 (Defined in 
Appendix) 
Advanced Gentrification 
(Moderate to High Income) 
  Population in 2000 or 2016 > 500 
  Moderate to High Income Tract in 2016 
  Gentrified in 1990-2000 or 2000-2016 (Defined in 
Appendix) 
Stable Exclusion 
(Moderate to High Income) 
 Population in 2000 > 500 
 Moderate to High Income Tract in 2016 
 Not classified as Ongoing Exclusion 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
Ongoing Exclusion  
(Moderate to High 
Income) 
 Population in 2000 > 500 
 Moderate to High Income Tract in 2016 
 Loss of Low-Income (“LI”) households 2000-2016 
(absolute loss) 
 LI migration rate (percent of all migration to tract that 
was LI) in 2016 < in 2009 
Super Gentrification or 
Exclusion 
(Very High Income) 
 Population in 2000 > 500 
 Median household income > 200% of regional 
median in 2016 
 
Figure 1: Map of Typologies in the New York Metropolitan Region166 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 166. Based on analysis by the authors from the New York dataset. See id; infra 
Appendix 1. 
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Figure 2: Typologies in Manhattan and Brooklyn167 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 167. Based on analysis by the authors from the New York dataset. See Chapple, 
Mapping NY., supra note 165; infra Appendix 1. 
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Overall, low-income households are dispersed throughout the 
different types (Figure 3).168  Less than half live in low-income 
neighborhoods, indicating that there is considerable neighborhood 
income diversity in the region. 
 
Figure 3: Location of Low-Income Households by Neighborhood 
Type169 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART IV: THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF RENT STABILIZATION 
This Part describes the way rent stabilization may work in different 
neighborhood contexts in the New York metropolitan region.  First, it 
summarizes the results of the study and identifies the number of units 
affected under potential rent stabilization measures and the change in 
rent and ownership across neighborhood types.  This Part then 
analyzes the role rent stabilization could play in each neighborhood 
type and in parts of the New York metropolitan region not currently 
covered by affordability protections.  It argues that rent stabilization 
 
 168. Created by the authors based upon the typology analysis, using the Urban 
Displacement New York dataset. See Chapple, Mapping NY., supra note 165; infra 
Appendix 1. 
 169. Created by the authors based upon the typology analysis, using the Urban 
Displacement New York dataset. See Chapple, Mapping NY., supra note 165; infra 
Appendix 1. 
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can play multiple roles: to prevent losing low-income households, 
address ongoing displacement, and slow gentrification in certain at-
risk neighborhoods.  Finally, it discusses different factors that 
policymakers should consider in a rent stabilization scheme. 
Rent stabilization is the primary tool available to increase renter 
stability and provide affordability protections.170  There is evidence 
that rent stabilization increases housing stability and decreases 
resident mobility, especially displacement due to external forces (such 
as increased rents) rather than choice.171  These impacts are seen in 
both rent stabilized units and in those units on the open market, not 
covered by renter protections.172 
Housing stability has long been a priority of the U.S. government, 
ever since policy measures were enacted in response to post-Great 
Depression homelessness and foreclosures.173  Though other methods 
of keeping low-income residents in their homes exist, rent 
stabilization holds the greatest promise for broad implementation.  
For example, the number of residents on the waiting list for Section 8 
vouchers in Los Angeles is over nine times the number of existing 
vouchers.174  The expansion of Section 8 vouchers would be very 
costly: the budget of the program was $22 billion for 2018, and an 
expansion of the program to 55,000 new targeted households is 
costing $450 million in 2019.175  Additionally, even a small increase in 
program size required pushing back against the current federal 
administration, and ultimately, research has found that the Section 8 
program does not materially improve housing conditions for most 
 
 170. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 21. 
 171. See Richard W. Ault et al., The Effect of Long-Term Rent Control on Tenant 
Mobility, 35 J.  URB. ECON. 140, 157 (1994); Joseph Gyourko & Peter Linneman, 
Equity and Efficiency Aspects of Rent Control: An Empirical Study of New York 
City, 26 J. URB. ECON. 54, 73–74 (1989); Jakob Munch & Michael Svarer, Rent 
Control and Tenancy Duration, 52 J. URB. ECON. 542, 557 (2002); Peter Dreier, A Fix 
for LA’s Housing Crisis: Repeal the Ellis Act, HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2017, 5:06 
PM) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/a-fix-for-las-housing-crisis-repeal-the-ellis-
act_b_597a3ccae4b06b305561cef4 [https://perma.cc/3T8Y-R8S3]; Clark & Heskin, 
supra note 64, at 116; Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 2; PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, 
at 4. 
 172. See Pastor et al., supra note 1, at 4. 
 173. See id. at 17. 
 174. See id. at 20. 
 175. Alison Bell & Douglas Rice, Congress Prioritizes Housing Programs in 2018 
Funding Bill, Rejects Trump Administration Proposals, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (July 19, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/congress-
prioritizes-housing-programs-in-2018-funding-bill-rejects-trump 
[https://perma.cc/M3W9-E7K]. 
1170 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
residents.176  In contrast, rent stabilization can be implemented at 
scale.  New York City’s rent regulation program demonstrates this, 
and it also illustrates methods to strengthen tenant protections and 
stability under rent stabilization.177  Rent stabilization exists in all five 
boroughs of the city, but significant portions of the region are 
unprotected or are covered under specific forms of rent stabilization 
restricted to limited unit types.178 
Rent stabilization has been found to have an impact on the portion 
of homes rented or owned, increasing the portion of homes owned 
instead of rented: a reduction in rents received means that some 
landlords take rental units off of the rental market.179  Landlords may 
elect to evict tenants so that they can move into their own units (often 
allowed under owner move-in eviction laws);180 or so owners can 
convert rental units to condominiums.  In conjunction with how rent 
stabilization has been shown to shift tenure to ownership,181 rent 
regulation decontrol tends to shift tenure back to rental.182  The 
change in rental tenure is not insignificant.  A study of San Francisco 
estimated that rental stock decreased by 15% due to rent stabilization 
over the 1979–1994 time period.183 
The following analysis provides an approximation of the number of 
units that could potentially preserve affordability under rent 
stabilization across different neighborhood types.  The neighborhood 
change typologies provide a framework to analyze the differing 
potential benefits or drawbacks of rent stabilization depending on 
neighborhood context.  For example, rent stabilization would play a 
vital role in maintaining affordability in some areas, and likely would 
reinforce the status quo in others. 
 
 176. Id. See generally William G. Grigsby & Steven C. Bourassa, Section 8: The 
Time for Fundamental Program Change?, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 805, 805 
(2004). 
 177. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #1 RENT STABILIZATION 
AND RENT CONTROL 1 (2018), https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/03/fact-
sheet-1-sj-final-12-19-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/82M2-7EXM]. 
 178. Lapides et al., supra note 136. 
 179. Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 30. 
 180. Elizabeth Naughton, Comment, San Francisco’s Owner Move-In Legislation: 
Rent Control or Out of Control?, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 537, 537–39 (1999). 
 181. See Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 44; see also Allan D. Heskin et al., The 
Effects of Vacancy Control, 66 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 162, 162 (2000); Daniel K. Fetter, 
The Home Front: Rent Control and the Rapid Wartime Increase in Home 
Ownership 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 19604, 2013); PASTOR 
ET AL., supra note 1, at 21. 
 182. Sims, supra note 65, at 145. 
 183. Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
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This exploratory analysis of the number of units eligible for rent 
stabilization was estimated based on Census data, using three criteria 
employed in the majority of rent stabilization measures in the region, 
including those in New York City.  These criteria were approximated 
using available Census cutoffs: buildings built before 1979, with five 
or more units, and rents below $2750.184  The number of eligible units 
for each tract was calculated by using the percent of rental units in 
each tract qualifying under the three specifications, along with the 
total number of rental units in each tract.  The approximation of 
falling under rent stabilization measures using Census data is 
assuming independence between building age and size and falling 
under the high-rent vacancy decontrol threshold.  This number is 
approximate, as the Census questions are asked separately, and the 
percent of units under the decontrol threshold is assuming an even 
distribution of units in the appropriate Census gross rent category.185  
It is likely that having a unit’s rent above the decontrol threshold of 
$2750 may be related to building size and age, though these variables 
had a low correlation.186 
Table 3 shows the total estimated number of units that would be 
eligible for rent stabilization within each New York regional 
neighborhood change typology using the rent stabilization eligibility 
criteria.187  The results are shown in the first column of Table 3.  
Table 3 also includes a measure of the approximate number of units 
affordable to the median regional household income, calculated as 
having rents less than 30% of the regional median monthly income 
($1500).188  This measure describes the total number of rental units 
under the $1500 threshold, irrespective of building age and size.  
Finally, the third column describes the approximate number of units 
eligible for rent stabilization, using the above qualifications, that are 
also under the $1500 rent threshold.  The table demonstrates the large 
number of units in the region that would be eligible for rent 
stabilization policies, as they now stand, as well as the approximate 
number of potential affordable units eligible for such policies.  The 
 
 184. Naughton, supra note 180. 
 185. Authors’ analysis of U.S. Census data. Infra Appendix 1.  
 186. Authors’ analysis of U.S. Census data. Infra Appendix 1. Correlation between 
percent of units above the $2750 threshold and units in buildings of 5 or more units 
built before 1979 is -0.0760.  
 187. Census tract-level estimates were summed by neighborhood type to determine 
these totals. 
 188. This is an approximation that does not take into account individual household 
incomes related to their rental costs. 
1172 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
patterns across different neighborhood types are described in 
individual sections below. 
 
Table 3: Rental Units Affected Under Potential Rent Stabilization 
Measures 
 
Neighborhood type Total units 
potentially preserved 
(eligible for current 
rent stabilization)189  
Affordable to 
median 
regional 
income190 
Affordable to median 
regional income and 
eligible for current 
rent stabilization191 
Not losing low-
income households 
194,100 272,100 136,100 
Ongoing 
displacement 
248,700 306,300 189,900 
At risk of 
gentrification 
365,200 484,500 309,100 
Ongoing or 
advanced 
gentrification 
262,000 331,300 194,400 
Stable or ongoing 
exclusion 
154,400 173,500 79,200 
Super gentrification 
or exclusion 
17,000 17,100 6400 
 
As shown below in Table 4, there have been changes in tenure type 
across the region between 1990 and 2016.  The percent of renters 
increased by 2% in areas not losing low-income households, by 1% in 
areas with ongoing displacement, and by 4% in areas at risk of 
gentrification.  The percent of renters decreased by 2.5% in areas 
facing stable or ongoing exclusion, and by 9% in those with super 
gentrification or exclusion. 
Table 4 also shows the diversity in the proportion of households in 
a tract that rent their homes, ranging from 79% of tracts at risk of 
gentrification to only 8% of super gentrification or exclusion tracts.  
These indicate the broad range of percent owner or renter across 
typologies, and the differing impacts that rent stabilization measures 
would have. 
 
 189. Approximation using the percent of buildings of 5+ units, built before 1979 in 
each Census Tract, under $2750 rent decontrol limit. 
 190. Under 30% of median regional monthly income: $1500. 
 191. Rent under $1500, total number of units in type eligible for rent stabilization. 
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Table 4: Change in Rent/Ownership Across Neighborhood Types 
 
 Percent 
renter 2016 
Percent change 
(percent renter) 1990-
2016 
Change in percent 
renters/percent owners, 
1990-2016 
Not losing low-
income 
households 
0.687 0.024 0.071 
Ongoing 
displacement 
0.752 0.014 0.144 
At risk of 
gentrification 
0.785 0.041 0.409 
Ongoing or 
advanced 
gentrification 
0.564 -0.009 -0.011 
Stable or 
ongoing 
exclusion 
0.363 -0.026 -0.022 
Super 
gentrification or 
exclusion 
0.086 -0.088 -0.014 
 
This Part uses the typologies to conduct an exploratory analysis of 
the role that rent regulation could play in each neighborhood type 
and in parts of the region not covered by affordability protections.  
Rent stabilization offers the primary way to keep people in their 
homes, providing essential stability, in terms of tenure, in areas prone 
to displacement, as well as income diversity in exclusive areas.192 
A. Not Losing Low-Income Households 
As described in Part II.B, areas that are not losing low-income 
households are classified as low-income in 2016 and do not have 
gentrification or displacement risk factors.193  These areas contain a 
 
 192. See Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 1 (demonstrating stability). See generally 
NYU FURMAN CTR., RENT STABILIZATION IN NEW YORK CITY (2012) 
http://furmancenter.org/files/HVS_Rent_Stabilization_fact_sheet_FINAL_4.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L52G-W8UK] (demonstrating income diversity). 
 193. See supra Part II. 
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significant number of units that would qualify for protection under 
rent stabilization laws.194  These may not be areas with the most 
opportunity or greatest immediacy to protect renters, but the 272,000 
units that are affordable to the regional median income serve an 
important purpose in housing residents in a region facing such high 
housing costs.195  Rent stabilization measures would protect half of 
these units, and research indicates that rent stabilization would not 
have a detrimental impact on house values or future construction.196 
B. Ongoing Displacement 
Areas facing the ongoing displacement of low-income households 
were low-income census tracts in 2016, which have been seeing a 
decline of low-income households but face few signs of 
gentrification.197  Similar to areas not losing low-income households, 
these are areas that contain a significant portion of the New York 
metropolitan region’s rental units affordable to the regional median 
income.  75% of residents in ongoing displacement tracts are 
renters.198  And given the rise in rents across the region, ensuring 
stability in areas with a significant share of renters is vital.  As noted 
above, several studies have shown that new housing supply is not 
affected by rent stabilization measures, but instead is impacted by the 
local economy and other conditions.199 
C. At Risk of Gentrification 
Census tracts at risk of gentrification contain the largest number of 
rental units affordable to the regional median income.  
Approximately 300,000 of these units would qualify for rent 
stabilization protections due to building type and age.200  These areas 
were low-income in 2016 and were classified as “hot market” from 
2000 to 2016.201  Each tract also meets three of four other 
 
 194. See supra Table 3. 
 195. See supra Table 3. 
 196. See Gilderbloom & Ye, supra note 69, at 214; Sims, supra note 65, at 1. See 
generally Richard Arnott, Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 
99 (1995); John Ingram Gilderbloom, Moderate Rent Control: Its Impact on the 
Quality and Quantity of the Housing Stock, 17 URB. AFF. Q. 123 (1981). 
 197. See supra Table 2. 
 198. Measured by the authors based upon the typology analysis, using the Urban 
Displacement New York dataset. See URB. DISPLACEMENT PROJECT, supra note 165. 
 199. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1 at 16; Gilderbloom, supra note 196, at 123; 
Gilderbloom & Ye, supra note 69, at 214; Sims, supra note 65, at 130. 
 200. See supra Table 3. 
 201. See supra Table 2. 
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qualifications: higher than median percent low-income households, 
percent college educated, percent renters, or percent nonwhite.202  
Overall, these tracts are 79% renter households.203 
These areas at risk of gentrification are primary locations that 
would benefit from rent stabilization measures, providing renter 
households with stability protections. 
D. Ongoing or Advanced Gentrification 
Historically, there has been considerable disagreement about 
which neighborhoods are considered to be gentrifying.204  The 
neighborhood typologies allow insight into where these areas are, at 
the forefront of displacement, and the loss of low-income households 
in the region. 
Renters in areas with ongoing and advanced gentrification are 
currently facing significant displacement pressures, with rising or 
raised rents and demographic changes in the neighborhood.205  These 
areas are therefore primary cases of the need for rent regulation to 
increase stability and allow remaining residents to stay in their homes.  
New, wealthy residents bring an inflow of capital into neighborhoods, 
but strategies like rent stabilization are needed to ensure that older 
residents are able to capture the benefits of new resources.206 
One recent study in San Francisco suggested rent regulation may 
fuel gentrification, because of a reduction in rental stock due to 
conversions to owner-occupancy,207 though other scholars have since 
argued that the study did not sufficiently account for the other 
pressures increasing rents in the area.208  Others have found no 
evidence of gentrification, and that rent stabilized buildings drive 
down surrounding rents.209 
E. Stable or Ongoing Exclusion 
The number of eligible rental units in exclusive neighborhoods is 
far fewer than that in the other neighborhood types, with 
approximately 173,000 units affordable to the median household 
 
 202. See id. 
 203. See supra Table 4. 
 204. See generally LORETTA LEES ET AL., GENTRIFICATION 4 (2008). 
 205. See supra Table 2. 
 206. See generally CHAPPLE, supra note 21, at 130–31. 
 207. See Naughton, supra note 180, at 537–41. 
 208. PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 12. 
 209. See Heskin et al., supra note 181, at 172; Sims, supra note 65, at 130. 
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income and 79,000 affordable units in eligible buildings.210  But these 
are some of the most important units to protect affordability in, for 
the sake of income diversity and opportunity, including allowing less 
wealthy residents to access benefits of income mixing and higher local 
investment in schools, parks, and other neighborhood amenities.211  
Rent stabilization and renter protections may be the best way to 
protect the presence of low-income neighbors in these areas, as rents 
and home values are very high, and federal programs seem to offer 
little access to wealthy neighborhoods for low-income households.212 
F. Super-Gentrification or Exclusion 
Areas that have gone through super-gentrification or exclusion 
have seen immense changes, with median household incomes over 
200% of the regional median in 2016 along with gentrification or 
exclusion indicators.213  As a result, there are few remaining 
affordable units in these areas.214  The percent of rental households 
decreased 8.8% from 1990–2016, and only 8.6% of units in these areas 
are renter-occupied.215  Meanwhile, only 6300 units are in eligible 
buildings with rents affordable to the regional median household 
income.216  Tenants would benefit from the distributional impacts of 
rent regulation; rent control measures have not been shown to 
decrease the supply of new construction.217 
 
 210. See supra Table 3. 
 211. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text. 
 212. See generally Jake Wegmann & Karen Christensen, Subsidized Rental 
Housing in the United States, 17 PLAN. F. 55, 64 (2016) (describing lack of access to 
opportunity); Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 1 (demonstrating stability). 
 213. See supra Table 2. 
 214. See supra Table 3. 
 215. See supra Table 4. 
 216. See supra Table 3. 
 217. PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 15. In areas with significant majority-owner 
households, it is worth noting the significant subsidies to homeowners. United States 
homeowners receive federal mortgage subsidies, in far greater amounts than that 
spent on rental subsidies — over two-thirds of the federal government’s spending on 
housing subsidizes homeowners. See Anthony Downs, Introduction: Why Rental 
Housing is the Neglected Child of American Shelter, in REVISITING RENTAL 
HOUSING: POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND PRIORITIES 7–8 (N. P. Retsinas & E. S. Belsky 
eds., 2008); Collinson et al., supra note 121, at 1 
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G. Ways to Work with Rent Control: Tenant Protections, Decontrol 
Thresholds 
Rent stabilization measures have potential benefits across the 
many typologies in the New York metropolitan region, but this is not 
to say rent stabilization measures are perfect.  Several strategies may 
be able to increase the effectiveness of rent stabilization measures in 
providing stability and affordable housing. 
i. High-Rent Vacancy Decontrol 
Currently, most rent stabilization regimes in the region include 
three decontrol provisions, allowing rental increases upon tenants 
vacating a unit, and allowing units to enter the open market after 
rents pass a threshold and have a vacancy — currently approximately 
$2770 — or when renters pass an income threshold and rents are at or 
above the rent threshold.218  Over 160,000 units in New York City left 
the stabilized housing stock from 1994–2018 due to high-rent vacancy 
deregulation, which accounted for over half of the total losses of 
stabilized housing units.219  This vacancy rent increase has led to 
incentives for landlords to push out tenants, as it means they are able 
to raise rents with each rental turnover, resulting in tenant 
harassment and unstable tenures for tenants.220  Reducing these 
incentives, by increasing or removing the high-rent vacancy decontrol 
threshold or reducing vacancy bonus increases, may lead to more 
stability for renters. 
 
 218. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #26 GUIDE TO RENT 
INCREASES FOR RENT STABILIZED APARTMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY 6 (2018), 
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/09/orafac26.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DWT2-MV2A]; N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT 
SHEET #1 RENT STABILIZATION AND RENT CONTROL 1 (2018), 
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/03/fact-sheet-1-sj-final-12-19-18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/82M2-7EXM]. 
 219. N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., CHANGES TO THE RENT STABILIZED HOUSING 
STOCK IN NEW YORK CITY IN 2018 1, 7 (2019), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/changes19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7TPJ-5ZP6]. 
 220. Elvin Wyly et al., Displacing New York, 42 ENV’T & PLAN. A 2602, 2609 
(2010). 
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ii. Increased Tenant Protections 
New York City recently rolled out a comprehensive tenant 
protection program, beginning in 2017.221  The program provides free 
legal services for tenants falling under 200% of the federal poverty 
line, and includes access to legal services for tenants facing eviction in 
housing court and anti-harassment and displacement legal services.222  
In the first year of the service, close to 250,000 residents had made use 
of the program, including approximately 26,000 households facing 
eviction cases in Housing Court.223  This program is feasible due to 
the capacity of related nonprofit organizations and legal services in 
New York City.  However, providing additional legal services in other 
areas would strengthen the tenure benefits of rent stabilization 
measures. 
iii. Code Enforcement and Other 
Regulations and enforcement may be able to reduce some of the 
negative side effects that have come with rent stabilization.  Studies 
have shown that some of the affordability provided by rent stabilized 
units may come at the cost of maintenance problems, likely due to a 
lack of incentives on the part of landlords and underreporting by 
tenants.224  Increased code enforcement may remedy this issue.225 
An increase in condominium conversions often occurs due to rent 
regulations.226  Unlike Mitchell-Lamas or HDFCs, these are market-
rate condominiums, catering to higher-income residents.227  New 
York City prevents the condominium conversion of rent stabilized 
units: rent stabilized tenants are allowed to stay on in the building as 
renters.228  Currently limited to New York City, this type of measure 
 
 221. OFFICE OF CIVIL JUSTICE, UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES 1 (2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hra/downloads/pdf/services/civiljustice/OCJ-UA-2018-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSJ2-M5SJ]. 
 222. Id. at 16. 
 223. Id. at 1. 
 224. See Nandinee K. Kutty, The Impact of Rent Control on Housing 
Maintenance: A Dynamic Analysis Incorporating European and North American 
Rent Regulations, 11 HOUSING STUD. 69, 83 (1996). 
 225. Id. at 69. 
 226. Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 5. 
 227. See id. 
 228. Press Release, Carl E. Heastie, Assembly Speaker, N.Y. State Assembly, 
Assembly Passes Historic Affordable Housing Protections to Bring Stability to 
Tenants Across New York State (June 14, 2019), 
https://nyassembly.gov/Press/files/20190614a.php [https://perma.cc/LZ95-J367]. 
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is helpful when thinking about potential expansions of rent 
stabilization to the region, to reduce the likelihood of residents living 
in affordability-protected units from being forced out. 
CONCLUSION 
By examining the potential extent of universal rent stabilization 
across the New York metropolitan region, this study found that the 
measure could keep rents affordable for over 800,000 families just in 
these three types of areas: gentrifying, at risk, and exclusive.  Just as 
rent stabilization plays a role in preserving affordability for tenants, it 
also acts to stabilize communities and preserve security of tenure.  
These impacts of rent stabilization vary according to neighborhood 
context.  Rent stabilization could potentially play a particularly 
effective role in gentrifying areas, by reducing rent increases; in areas 
at risk of gentrification, by keeping rents low; and in exclusive areas, 
by preserving access to resources and opportunity.  Gentrifying, at 
risk, and most notably exclusive areas are present not just in New 
York City, but throughout the metropolitan region.  It is important to 
assess how rent stabilization could slow displacement in communities 
throughout the 31 counties. 
The expansion of rent regulation is not a far-fetched dream.  In 
February 2019, Oregon passed legislation establishing rent control for 
the entire state.229  Moreover, in June 2019, New York State passed 
legislation (S6458) to strengthen and expand rent regulation across 
the state.230  While this Article describes the state of rental 
protections in the New York metropolitan region prior to S6458, the 
potential of the expansion of rent stabilization described in the 
Article still holds.  By increasing tenant protections and by allowing 
all jurisdictions to opt into the Emergency Tenant Protection Act, 
S6458 makes the expansion of rent stabilization in the New York 
metropolitan region more feasible and impactful than before. 
Rent stabilization is one of many possible tools to preserve 
affordability and stabilize communities.  There are dozens of 
mechanisms to protect individual tenants, preserve affordable units, 
and plan for diversity over the long-term.231  Yet, few of these will act 
 
 229. S.B. 608, 80th Legis. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019). 
 230. See supra note 1; see also Luis Ferré-Sadurní et al., Landmark Deal Reached 
on Rent Protections for Tenants in N.Y., N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/nyregion/rent-protection-regulation.html 
[https://perma.cc/BJ6W-9J9J]. 
 231. See generally Karen Chapple, A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Affordable 
Housing Policy: Learning from Climate Change Policy, BERKELEY BLOG (February 
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fast enough or at a large enough scale to preserve affordability, and 
many will not work in the contexts where stabilization is most needed.  
For instance, inclusionary housing ordinances take years to produce a 
few units,232 and land costs make construction of new affordable units 
very expensive in the core of strong market cities.233  Therefore, rent 
stabilization deserves a closer look at how it can make and keep cities 
and suburbs diverse and inclusive. 
  
 
11, 2016), https://blogs.berkeley.edu/2016/02/11/a-multi-dimensional-approach-to-
affordable-housing-policy-learning-from-climate-change-policy/ 
[https://perma.cc/PN69-B5TT]. 
 232. See CHAPPLE, supra note 21, at 82. 
 233. See REID & RAETZ, supra note 134, at 1. 
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APPENDIX 1: TYPOLOGY METHODOLOGY 
 
 Vulnerable to gentrification in 1990 or 2000 
• Housing affordable in base year (housing sales prices or 
rent < 80% of median) 
  and (any 3 of 4) 
• % low-income households > regional median 
• % college educated < regional median 
• % renters > regional median 
• % nonwhite > regional median 
 “Hot Market” in 2000 or 2016 
• Change in median real rent > regional median 
  or 
• Change in median value for owner-occupied homes > 
regional median 
 Gentrification from 1990 to 2000 or 2000 to 2016 
• Vulnerable in base year (as defined above) 
• Demographic change between base and end years: 
• Difference in % college educated > regional 
median 
• Percent change in real median household income > 
regional median 
• “Hot market” (defined above) 
 If any individual variable is missing, then the whole typology is 
missing. 
 Tracts with a coefficient of variation > 30% on several key 2016 
variables are flagged and determined unreliable: 
• Population 
• Housing units 
• Median rent 
• Median home value 
• Median income 
• College count 
• Renter count 
 
 
